Twenty-two years
ago, Santa Barbara voters faced a decision like the one the state
faces today in the Delta. Voters had to decide whether to build a
144-mile pipeline from the state's aqueduct to the coast, thus
bringing northern water (from the Delta) to Santa Barbara consumers.
The coastal residents were plagued by drought and thought this would
solve their problems. In fact, they were promised it would. Water,
they were told, would be more “reliable” – as much as 97
percent reliable. The costs, at a promised $270 million, would be bearable. It all added up on
paper.
Santa Barbara sought water from the Delta and paid bigtime for it. photo from California Water Impact Network |
On Thursday, the
Brown Administration released the first of three parts of a plan to
build two huge tunnels for carrying water from the north Delta (near
Hood) to the southern parts of the state, thus bypassing the Delta's
stressed ecology. Citizens will not vote on this plan, which is
being requested and shouldered by water contractors south of the
Delta. San Joaquin farmers and some Los Angeles water districts
believe they will have a more reliable water supply with a north
Delta diversion.
Reality versus
promises
The reality in
Santa Barbara, however, was shockingly different from expectations.
As the years rolled by, costs mounted, many times higher than
advertised. Water, it turned out, was not available during droughts.
Moreover, the water that was there during wet years could not be
stored, because Santa Barbara's lake-reservoir was full at those
times.
Now, two decades
later, some of the water districts that signed on the dotted line are
in financial difficulty. They are having a hard time generating enough money from sales of
water (made too expensive because of the pipeline) to pay off the
debt.
“I tried to stop
the state project (for Santa Barbara),” said Carolee Krieger, head
of the California Water Impact Network. “I knew it was bad. I just
didn't know how bad. The boondoggle has water distributors here
borrowing revenue bonds to pay their debt. That's like using your
credit card to pay off your mortgage.”
Driven by this and
other experiences in her years as a water warrior, Krieger is now
working to raise a water users revolt against the Bay Delta
conservation Plan, as the administration's new plan is called.
Some Differences,
with Alarming Parallels
Comparisons between
Santa Barbara in 1991 and California in 2013 could be off base; even
what happened in that coastal county is controversial. But some of
the bold outlines raise alarms. Let's look first at the dry years.
Dry Years and the
Price tag
The BDCP tunnels
can't be used much, if at all, during droughts, which will become
more common in the future with climate change. In fact, dry years
predominate in coming decades.
New pathway (isolated facility) on right would have two 40-foot diameter tunnels carry export water 150 feet below the surface, from near Sacramento to Tracy's pumps. |
And the mortgage is
likely to be a doozy. Most experts foresee some multiple of the $14
billion dollar price tag to be the real price. Such a big mortgage,
of course, leaves precious little credit for new storage. So, let's
look at the very wet years.
Wet Years and
Computer Water
The models predict
incredibly high exports during wet years – so much, in fact, that
the flow would exceed the capacity of south-of-delta reservoirs to
store it. If, for example, 2025 is a very wet year, the BDCP
estimates that it could export as much as 8.2 million acre feet. But
there is no evidence there is a place to put that much water south of the Delta. Even
if 2025 is an average wet year with projected exports of 6.8 million
acre feet, that would surpass the highest export ever from the delta,
which occurred two years ago in 2011.
In March and April
of 2011, exporters called a halt to the pumping because they had
nowhere to store the deluge. Their reservoirs were full. They
stopped pumping at 6.6 maf
“Unless they
(water contractors backing the BDCP) have storage, they are in big
trouble.” said Gartrell, who has examined the numbers from the BDCP studies. “If you don't
do something about having a place to put the water in wet years,
you're fooling yourself with these studies.”
In an interview and in his testimony,
Gartrell referred to these high export figures in wet years as
“computer water.” It looks good on paper, but “when it comes to
real life, you can't get it.”
The Role of
Storage in “Reliability”
To be more
accurate, you can get it, but you can't keep it.
Terry Erlewine,
general manager of the State Water Contractors – the group that is
pushing for big twin tunnels – agreed that the maximum water in wet
years could not be used. He said that “at some point, in the
really wet years, you might have to have additional storage to take
advantage of it.” He added, SWC is only providing the
“capability,” for delivering the water. “It's up to the water
users to figure out how to use it.”
A spokesperson for
the Department of Water Resources, home of the BDCP, said only,
“There's no simple answer to that question,” when asked whether
south-of-delta contractors could export and store water that exceeded
6.6 maf. She said it depended on how full the reservoirs were
already.
Water levels (red line) hit the ceiling in the winter/spring of 2011 in San Joaquin Valley's main reservoir, causing export pumping to stop prematurely. |
A Call for
Broader Plans
The dry/wet year
quandary – you can't get it in dry years and can't store it in wet
– has raised a concerted call for more and broader alternatives
from environmental groups and water agencies north and south.
Gartrell's water
district has joined with half a dozen other districts, including East
Bay Mud and San Diego, plus a coalition of environmental and business groups, legislators and members of Congress, to
propose an alternative to the BDCP – one that would cut the size of
the tunnels to one third (3,000 cfs), while advocating for new
storage and improvements to levees. This “portfolio” approach
seems to make much more sense than relying only on a pipeline to
deliver water that is – whatever the size of the tunnel –
unreliable by nature.
Erlewine's organization disparaged the small tunnel. He said it would only fill the main south-of-delta
reservoir (San Luis Reservoir) ten percent of the time, so more
storage would not even be needed.
But Gartrell urged
water contractors to take another look at the figures, emphasizing
that a smaller, cheaper tunnel gives 90-97 percent as much water as the
bigger one, when all the constraints of operating it are factored in.
Most of the time, he said, you can't export more than 3,000 cfs from
the north Delta because the rules require leaving necessary bypass flows in the river.
“Most
years the big tunnels won't make a dime's worth of difference. Just
adding capacity ignores the fact that most of the water still goes
through the south (the pumps at Tracy), especially in dry years”
because of needed protections for fisheries.
because of needed protections for fisheries.
Back
to Governor Brown
If a tunnel one third the size of that being
proposed by the Brown Administration delivers 90 to 97 percent of the
goods, why isn't it under consideration? One answer is that the
small conduit relies on new storage capability to meet export goals,
and contractors have their eyes fixed on a big, big pipe stuffed
partially with paper water. Erlewine and others who support the BDCP
said they certainly are not opposed to increased storage –
everybody wants it. Contractors in the SWC “may be thinking about
it,” said Erlewine, “but I'm not aware of any such plans.”
So, who has the capacity to broaden the goals
for the good of the state? Not the citizens. Not any state water
agency this reporter has consulted. The state legislature seems
disinclined. It's up to the State and Federal Administrations, said Gartrell.
“I'm not pessimistic, but we need leadership
from the Administrations. I don't mean they can impose it, but they
can bring people along to get the best project, and I think that's possible.”